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of the collision. There is a marked pedestrian lane
running in a northeasterly, southwesterly direction
across the street and it is contended by the plaintiff that
she proceeded in the pedestrian lane to the center of the
highway, then proceeded easterly approximately 45 feet,
then proceeded in a southeasterly direction toward her
home which is designated on the map as 937 West 2nd
South, and that the accident occurred when she was in
the second traffic lane on the south side of the street.
Harold A. Peterson, Jr., called as plaintiff's witness
testified that he investigated the accident as a Salt Lake
City Police Officer, and made certain measurements at
the scene. He testified that the left side of the automobile
was just over, by a matter of inches or a foot of the first
yellow line south of the center lane at a point 306 feet
east of the 9th West intersection and 14 feet from the
south curb and 13 feet from the south center lane of
traffic, and that there were light scuff marks on the
street approximately 3 feet from where the automobile
came to rest (R. 11). He did not recall any blood stains
on the street, and the injured person had been removed
by police ambulance prior to the investigation. (R. 12).
He saw no indications of brake marks. (R. 13).
W. 0. Cowden. Salt Lake Police Officer testified for
plaintiff that he investigated the accident with Officer
Peterson and discussed the accident with the defendant
at the scene. Tnat defendant told him he would estimate
that he was approximately 50 feet from the pedestrian
when he realized the danger first and that he had been
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traveling 25 miles per hour and his estimated speed at
the time of impact was one mile per hour; that he had
just pushed the pedestrian ahead of the automobile (R.
15).
Golden J. Bennett, the defendant wa.s called by
plaintiff as a witness and testified that on the date of
the accident he was 18 years of age. (R. 18). That he
was employed at Lang Co. and had left his work shortly
after 6 :00 o'clock. (R. 19). That upon proceeding from
his work easterly on West 2nd South, he entered lane
No. 1 which is the southerly most traffic lane on the
south side of the street and proceeded in that lane. (R.
21).

Q. '' .A.s you hit the intersection, that would
be the 'vest side of the intersection of 9th West
and 2nd South Street, how fast were you travelling, ~Ir. Bennett~
. .-\... I could not tell you for sure, I was not
watching my speedometer, but I wasn't going
very fast.
Q. What is your best judgment of your

speed~

A. Oh, 25 miles an hour, maybe 20- 30, somewhere around there." (Tr. 22)

* *

*

Q. (By l\1r. Beatie)

''Will you mark that
please, then, let's mark it 'D 1' the position. Now
when you \vere at point 'D 1' \viii you mark on the
diagram ''There Mrs. Smith was, please, Mr. Bennett u!

A. vVell, 'vhen I first saw Mrs. Smith it
seemed to me like she \vas walking into these
yello'v lines right approximately here.
3
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Q. Just mark that then with a rircle, say, and

mark that '8'. No'Y "~hen you \Yere at point 'B 1'
and you observed ~frs. Smith at point '8', how
fast was your car traYelling ·1
A. ..A.pproximately 25 miles an hour."

* * *
Q. Between point '' B 1 '' and the "\\rest edge
of the cross \Valk marked upon Exhibit B, did you
reduce your speed by applying your brakes at any
point 1

A. Yes. (R. 25)
Q. (By lvir. Beatie) Now will you tell me, Mr.

Bennett, how far west of the \Yest line of the cross
walk point '' B 1 '' is in your best judgment.

A. I could not tell you for sure, I do not kno\v
the distance from the cross,valk to the map here.
I imagine it was 50 or 75 feet, something like
that. (R. 26)
Q. I want to kno\v ,,·hat your judgment is of

where you first observed her starting to run
across the street and at what point on the south
portion of the highway were you at that time.

A. I first observc<l her \Yhen she started to
run across the street approximately right here.

Q. You are indicating in the a rea of "S 4 ", is
that correct~
A. That is correct. (R. 31)
Q. Will you make below '' B

then, please,
25-30 feet'~ Now at point "B 5" ho"· fast were
you travelling, ~Ir. Bennett.
f)''

A. I have no idea, sir. .A.t that point I had
already slo,ved down for 1\frs. Smith once and I
thought I had the right of "·ay. (R. 32)
4
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Q. .A.Jld \Ya~ she walking at all times between
point '' S 1'' and '' S 4'' in a southeasterly direction?
A. \V ell she stopped when I honked my horn,
you see, she "'"as then at point "S 4".

Q. She "~as then at a point "S 4", is that
correct, ,,,.hen you honked your horn~
~l.

.A.pproximately, yes. (R. 36)

THE COURT: From the time you honked
your horn until she started to run in front of your
car as you say she did, how far did you travel~
THE \VITNESS : Approximately 25 or 30
feet, maybe, I don't know. (R. 37)

Q. (By Mr. Beatie) J\1r. Bennett, would you
say that as you haYe diagrammed here at point
"B 5" that you travelled a distance then of 25 to
30 feet while Mrs. Smith ran 13 feet, is that
correct~

A. Well, sir, I don't know, that is just an approximate diagram I put there. I have no measurements or anything to go by there, I don't
know. (R. 38)

Q. No\v let me ask you from point ''B 5'' on
the Exhibit B did your car vary in its path from
that point to the point of impact~
A. Yes.

Q. Very

much~

A. I just turned a little.

Q. In which

"~ay

did it turn f

A. It turned right a little, it skidded right a
little.

Q. Skidded right f
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A. Yes, kind of. (R. 40)
Ross J. Smith, the husband of plaintiff testified:
Q. And it is your best estimate it is bet,veen

80 and 85 feet east of the east side of the cross
walk to- the point at which you first found your
wife's body.
A. Yes.
Q. Now ho\v could you identify that particular

spot, or \vas there anything that would indicate
what that spot was \vhen you first arrived there.
A. You mean when I first got out to the scene
of the accident'
Q. Yes, the scene of the accident.

A. There was a puddle of blood on the end
of the white line. (R. 53)
Plaintiff testified in her behalf that she had resided
at 937 West 2nd South for about seven years and had
been employed at the \Vestern Co-op for about ten ~Tears
as a cashier (R. 61). That plaintiff has never had any
injuries to her body of any kind but has \vorn glasses
since she \vas about 20 years old~ that she is no\v 55
years of age and had not had a doctor in atte11dancc in
the last ten years. (R. 62) ; that on the eYPlling of the
accident she came out of the Western Co-op "Tith a fello\v
employee, l\{rs. Ostberg and l\fr. \Vright, her employPr
was at the door and saw' her \Valk easterly from the
entrance of the Western Co-op to the driYe\vay \vith
Mrs. Ostberg. (R. 53).
Q. Take the pencil so ~·ou eau mark it from
\\rhere you left ~[r~. Osther~ and \vhat path you
took in going home.
()
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A. I left Mrs. Ostberg here by the truck and
I came do,vn here and come down here to the
curbing.

Q. All right. Now at the curbing let me ask
you this. ~-\ t the curbing did you make any observation of traffic on 2nd South Street'
.A.. I looked eastvlard. (R. 64)

Q. Did you look 'vest at all'
A. No, sir.

Q. What did you observe as far as your traffic
was concerned toward the east'
A. There \Vas a car coming.

Q. How you any opinion as to how far the
car '""as R\vay ~
A. It \Yas up toward 8th West.

Q. Now where did you go from the point you
were at the curbing, Mrs. Smith'
A. I came across-

Q. Just make a mark with the pencil.
A. I came in through here and came to the
center lane where the yellow line is in the middle.

Q. At that particular point did you make any
observation of the traffic on 2nd South Street~
A. I stopped there, sir, and looked west.

Q. Which \vay did you

look~

A. Westward, sir.

Q. What did you observe in reference to the
traffic situation 'vest of you on 2nd South Street
at that point' Was a car or cars coming down the
streetf
7
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A. A car "\vas coming \vay down the street.
Q. N O\Y \vhen you say "'"ay do\vn the street,

which way1

A. Almost to lOth West.
Q. What next did you do '1

A. Then after I stopped there I walked upQ.

Just mark with the pencil where you

walked.
A. I \valked up this yellow line in through here.
Q. Now have you any opinion as to how far

you walked from the point in the center of the
street in an easterly direction J ( R. 65)
A. I guess about 45 feet.
Q. You had proceeded from a point in the

cross \valk in an easterly direction, I understand,
between the yellow line easterly a bout 45 feet Y
A. That's right. (R. 66)
Q. 1\tirs. Smith, the last question asked last

night was, was the white apron, a portion of the
butcher's apron which you had on clear around
your body below the hips, and the answer was
"Yes". It is my impression that the previous
position at which that question \vas asked, \va.s
that you were in the center of the street, between
the marked lines, east of the crosswalk; is that
correct1
A. Yes.
Q. No\v then, yon \vere at that position which

you have said in your judgment \vas approximately 45 feet east, bet\\·ecn the marked center
line, did you make any observation of traffi<' to
the west which 'vould he coming easterly 1
8
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A. Before I crossed the street I stopped and
looked.

Q. N O\Y, l\1rs. Smith, will you just listen to
the question, please and we will get along faster.
When you were in the center lines, you had gone
45 feet east; I understand you to say you stopped~
~l.

I did, sir.

Q. All right. When you were at that portion
of the highway between the lines, when you came
to the stop, did your observe the condition of
traffic on the south portion of West Second South
Street1
A. There \Yas n car-parked cars west of 9th
West. (R. 102)

Q. Was there any other traffic that you observed on the south portion of 2nd South~
A. There \Yasn 't anything bet,veen 9th West
and ,,,.here I \vas.

Q. \:Vhat next did you do~ Withdra\v that.
Did you leave that particular point after having
made that observation~
.A. Yes.

Q. What did you

do~

A_. I sa-vv the car down there, and started to
cross the street.

Q. Which \vay did you

walk~

A. I walked over to the south side.

Q. Did you run at

all~

A. Not that I know of.
Q. Well you -vvere there; did you walk or did
you run~
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A. Well I have al\Yays

Q. Which direction did

"~alked
~vou

rather quickly.

w·alk?

A. I walked south.

Q. Why were you \valking in that direction,
Mrs. Smith~
1\. Because my home is just there. (R. 103)

Q. (By Mr. Beatie) Now "Then you say, 1\tirs.
Smith, that you were proceeding to,vard your
home, in what general direction 'vere you walking from the center lines of West 2nd South
Street~

A. South-southeast to my home.

Q. Now how far did you walk from the renter
cross lines on the south portion of 2nd South
Street1
A. I \Vas in the center one-in the second line.
(R. 105)

Q. Which Jane were you in 1
A. Lane 1.

Q. You were in Lane 1?
A. Yes.

Q. What happened, if anything1
A. .AJl I can remember is that I heard an
awful grinding noise and it felt like my body \Vas
whirling around, nud I hit. r_rhat is all. ('l"r. 106)
The witness then described in detail tht) uaturP of
her injuries and the places in her body \\·hieh \rere injured and the pain and suffering shP still has. (H.. 12£-i).

10
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CROSS EXAMINATION
Q. ~[rs. Smith, as I understand your testimony, you said that when you got about 45 feet
east of the center of the street, east of the center
of the pedestrian lane, and center of the street,
that you looked to,vard the 'vest; is that right f
..._-\. \~ es.
Q. 1\..nd then yon started across the
...._~.

street~

Yes.

Q. --._\nd were you 'valking fast or hurrying, as
you 'Yent across the street, or running f

A. I walked, the 'vay I have always walked. I
didn't 'Yalk slowly, sir.
Q. Well, did you walk faster than you usually
did?
.A. No ; faster than I do now. I cannot walk
as fast ; faster than I do now.

Q. Would it be fair to say, Mrs. Smith, that
the last time you-that your testimony in court is,
that the last time you looked to the west was when
you were in the center of the street, at this point
45 feet east of the pedestrian lane f
A. I looked there before I started crossing the
street.

Q. Then you walked southwesterly across the
· first lane of traffic~
_A. Wouldn't be southwest, -my home.

Q. Southeasterly-! mean southeasterly. You
walked southeasterly toward your homef Is that
right'? (R. 126)
.i\.. Yes.

11
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Q. So you walked from the center line here,
to the point ''There the impact occurred, "Tithout
looking back again~

I can't say "rhether I happened to look
that way again or not. It is too long ago for me to
remember. (Tr. 127)
.1\._.

Ed,vin W. Wright testified for the plaintiff as follows:
Q. Now \vill you just tell the court and the

jury please, \vhat you observed from that particular position, 1[r. \Vright, on that night!
A. The first thing that happened, that I paid
any attention to, 'vas a serious screeching of some
automobile brakes, and then that stopped. It
stopped as if it had hit, or probably· he going to
hit something or someone, and I \\Tent oYer to,vard
that direction, and there on the ground, about, oh
I would say 15 or 20 feet from the south sidewalk,
'vas my employe there, lying on the ground, and
her head was bleeding on the rear, and she called
for her glasses. Somebody had them and she got
them. And I stayed there a few minutes, and then
I went back to my place of business.
Q. Now at any time from your point of obser-

vation, from '"here you were at Western Co-op,
did you hear any warning signal given, such as a
horn honk or anything, immediately prior to the
screeching of the brakes.
A. No, sir. (R. 97)
Helen Ostberg testified for the plaintiff as follo"'S:
Q. What next did you hear or observe there

that

evening~

A. Well I was half in the truek, a rlosed-panel
truck, and I heard a loud noise, so I drew back,
12
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to see "'"hat it 'vas, and at that time I saw a body
about t\\~'O or three feet in the air, and it then
rolled along the pavement, much like a sack of
potatoes, and gave the resemblance somebody had
fallen out of a. car-really (R. 99) rolled quite
fast.
Frank W. Bonner, testified for the plaintiff that he
witnessed the accident at a point about 75 feet east of
the cross walk. (R. 134).
Q. Then you only noted her in the center of

the street first 1 ; had she ever crossed before you
-let's start again. She crossed the street then
in front of your car; is that correct'
A. That is right.
Q. And was she walking or what you say between a walk and a trot'
A. She was hurrying.
Q. So you were how many feet east of her
'vould you say when she left the center of the
street'
A. I imagine about 40 feet by that time, -40
or 50 feet.
Q. And did she continue right on as she passed
the center line on the south portion of the highway1
A. She hesitated.
Q. She hesitated 1
A. Yes.
Q. And what do you mean by ''hesitated''?
(R. 137)
A. I don't know what anybody would stop in
the middle of the road for unless to look.
Q. Would you say then she just hesitated and
looked and started ·off again; is that it1
13
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A. Yes.

Q. Now at the time she hesitated in the center
of the street, did you observe any car coming
east, Mr. Bonner~
A. Yes. (R. 138)

Q. Now while this particular car came in an
easterly direction, which you observed with two
lights, did you follow it to know that it was the
Bennett car and the one involved in the accident?
A. I seen Mr. Bennett hit the object.

Q. And from the point which you have initialed
here, as being west of the crosswalk, did that car
vary at all from one lane to another as it approached in an easterly direction?
A. Well, it seemed like it wanted to go just a
little bit to the number 2 lane, and then it switched
back in,-not too much. I was slowing down at
the time. I had a feeling something was going to
happen; something just told me something was
going to happen. (R. 139).

Q. Did you hear the honking of a horn just
before the accident happened~

A. No.

*

*

•

Q. And do you have any estimation of how
fast he was traveling before the impact of his
automobile~

A. I was going west, and it is pretty hard for
me to judge. I thought maybe bet,veen 30 and
maybe a little faster; not much. Maybe I might
be "·roug there too. It is hard to tell which way
you are going, and hO\\' fast n man is going inside
of your O\Yn car. (R. 140)
14
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Q. Then from that position in which these left
""'heels were five feet, he then cut back into Lane
No. 1; is that correct 1
A. That is right.
Q. Now will you just mark from this mark
here, where he cut back into Lane No. 1 ~ Will
you just draw it to the best of your ability~

. A.. He just started in a little, and came back
into here, you know, in this vicinity here; he
straighte~ed up. (R. 145)
Charles Henry Sweat testified for the plaintiff as
follows:
Q. She was bleeding from the

head~

A. Yes, there was a little blood there, I noticed.
Q. Did you observe any particular marks on
it-traffic marks on it-from the Bennett car?

A. Yes, I noticed his brake.

Q. In other worqs, as we call it-burning
rubber; did you notice any marks from his burning rubber just prior to the accident~
A. Yes, I did. I noticed that, the length he
skidded. I noticed that.

Q. How far would you estimate that was, Mr.
. Sweat; was it west of the crosswalk~ The brake
marks~

A. No, definitely right against the woman,
right close to the woman. As a matter of fact, the
time I heard the brakes 'vas the time I saw the
collision; I don't know if he applied his brakes at
the time the impact was. (R. 155)
15
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At the conclusion of the evidence for plaintiff Rex
J. Hanson, attorney for defendant, made a motion for
a non -suit. The Court then stated :
THE COURT: "Members of the Jury in this
case it is the opinion of the Court that the plaintiff
was contributorily negligent in two respects ; in
failing to keep a proper lookout for vehicles, and
also in depriving the defendant-driver of the
right-of-way." (R. 161)
"In that event, the pedestrian is obligated to
yield the right-of-way to the vehicle. In this case,
that observation was not made and that would
have to be a failure to observe because the vehicle
was there, where it would reach that point at the
same time as the pedestrian. However, the pedestrian did not observe it, and the only way that
you could say that the vehicle did not have the
right-of-way, would be to say he was solfar back
he was traveling at a high rate of speed, and the
pedestrian could not observe it.
'' There is some evidence of speed here, and
some conflicting evidence. The evidence might be
sufficient to show negligence on the part of the
defendant, in which event we would have to decide,
but I do not think the evidence is sufficient to
Rhow that the automobile did not have the rightof-,vay." (R. 163)
Mr. Rex J. Hanson then withdrew his motion for
non-suit and made a motion for a directed verdict whieh
was granted and a verdict signed by the foremall of the
Jury.

16
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STATEMENT OF POINT RELIED UPON
POINT I.
THAT THE COURT ERRED IN DIRECTING A
VERDICT THAT THE PLAINTIFF WAS GUILTY
OF NEGLIGENCE AS A PROXIMATE CAUSE OF
THE ACCIDENT.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THAT THE COURT ERRED IN DIRECTING A
VERDICT THAT THE PLAINTIFF WAS GUILTY
OF NEGLIGENCE AS A PROXIMATE CAUSE OF
THE ACCIDENT.
In Hess v. Robinson, (Utah) 163 Pac. (2d) 510.
Justice Larson said at page 512:
"As to what the circumstances were at the
time plaintiff entered the intersection, and as to
whether entering under such circumstances was
an act from which a person of ordinary prudence
and caution would have foreseen that some injury
'vould likely result, are matters upon which reasonable minds may differ. As such they are
properly for the jury. Proximate cause and contributory negligence are ordinarily questions of
fact for the jury to determine under all the circumstances. (Citing Cases). Questions of negligence do not become questions of law for court
except where the facts are such that all reasonable
.
* * *
men draw the same coneI us1ons.

17
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"Since in this cause there is a. question as to
what were the circumstances existing when plaintiff entered the intersection, and where those circumstances may be found by the trier of the fact
to be such that reasonable men might differ as to
whether plaintiff's conduct in entering the intersection was such as an ordinarily prudent and
careful man might do under the circumstances,
there was a question for the jury as to whether
plaintiff's negligence was contributory, that is,
was the proximate cause of the injury. ''
In Hickok v. Skinner, CU:tah) 190 Pac. (2d) 514.
Justice Wolfe said at page 519:
"Even if it be conceded that plaintiff was contributorily negligent as a matter of la\v, the question of whether or not such negligence was a substantial causative factor in producing the collision
was one of fact. Even if plaintiff had taken a
second or third look, such might not have revealed
to him that defendant would not yield the rightof-way to him, until too late for plaintiff to avert
the accident. This case is somewhat similar to
Hess v. Robinson, 109 Utah 60, 163 P. (2d) 510.
In that case plaintiff was driving on a through
highway and did not see the defendant's ambulance approaching from the right. The ambulance
went through the stop sign and crashed into plaintiff's automobile. The trial court held both parties
negligent as a matter of law, but submitted the
case to the jury on the question of whether or not
plaintiff's contributory negligence was a proximate cause of the damage. From a verdict and
judg1nent for plaintiff, defendants appealed. We
affirmed. Although the court divided on thP question of \\·hcther or not plaintiff 'vas guilty of
contributory negligence as a matter of la,v, \VP
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agreed unanimously that the question of proximate cause "~as one for the jury. I recognize that
the facts of this case are somewhat different from
those in the Hess case, but the underlying reasoning should be the same.''
In

H~tnter

v. Michaelis, (Utah) 198 Pac. (2d) 245.

Justice Wolfe said at pa.ge 253:
''I am also in accord with the view that it is a
jury question as to whether the plaintiff exercised
due care in keeping a lookout while she was crossing the street and whether she gave sufficient reappraisals of the traffic approaching from the
"\vest as she was proceeding across. _That is what
I contended for in Hickok v. Skinner, Utah, 190
P. (2d) 514."
Justice Latimer said at page 254:
''As I interpret the California decisions and
analyze the reasoning of this court in the Hickok
v. Skinner case, supra, I come to the conclusion
that under the law in both jurisdictions the trial
judge was right when he refused to direct a verdict against plaintiff based on the principle that
she was guilty of negligence as a matter of law.''
In Martin v. Stevens, (Utah) 243 Pac. (2d) page 746.
Justice Crockett at page 749 said :
''The question of contributory negligence is
usually for the jury and the court should be reluctant to take consideration of this question of
fact from it. Nielson v. Mauchley, Utah, 202 P.
(2d) 547; Toomer's Estate v. Union Pacific Railroad Co., Utah, 239 P. (2d) 163. The expressions
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in those cases are in accord with this uniformly
accepted doctrine. The right to trial by jury
should be safeguarded. Before the issue of contributory negligence may be taken from the jury,
the defendant's burden of proving both (a) that
plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence,
and (b) that such negligence proximately contributed to cause his own injury, must be met, and
established with such certainty that reasonable
minds could not find to the contrary; conversely,
if there is any reasonable basis, either because of
lack of evidence, or from the evidence and the fair
inferences arising therefrom, taken in the light
most favorable to plaintiff, upon which reasonable
minds may conclude that they are not convinced
by a preponderance of the evidence either (a) that
plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence or
(b) that such negligence proximately contributed
to cause the injury, the plaintiff is entitled to haYe
the question submitted to a jury.''
In Gibbs v. Blue Cab, Inc., (Utah) 249 Pac. (2d) 213.
Justice Henriod at page 215 of the opinion said :
''Assuming that in one aspect, by showing a
violation of the city ordinance, defendant established some negligence .on the part of deceased as
a matter of law, the problem remains as to
whether absence of the lamp under all the facts
was or was not a contributing proximate cause of
the collision,-particularly in view of the faet that
immediately prior to the time of impact the bicycle, and therefore the lamp, was pointed away
from the vision of the defendant-a proper jury
question.
"We are committed to the principle that Dlatters of neo·li
O'PJH'C' contributory IH ·gli u·ence and
~
~
'
•
M
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proximate cause generally are jury questions, unless the evidentiary facts are of such conclusive
character as to require all reasonable minds to
conclude that the ultimate fact of negligence, contributory negligence or proximate cause does or
does not exist. Recognizing the rule that the trial
court's conclusions will remain undisturbed unless clearly arbitrary, we believe that application
to this case of the principles mentioned, being the
only practical yardstick applicable in intersection
cases, compels us to disagree with the trial court's
conclusions.''
In Stickle v. Union Pacific R. Co., (Utah) 251 Pac.
(2d) 867.
Justice Crockett said at page 870:
''The authorities frequently state that the
question of contributory negligence is usually for
the jury. And that this is so wherever the evidence
is such that reasonable minds may differ as to its
existence ha.s been stated innumerable times,
which is undoubtedly correct. However, in view
of the fact that before the issue may be taken from
the jury, the defendant has the burden of establishing plaintiff's negligence by a preponderance
of the evidence it may be a bit more ;precise to
state that the question of contributory negligence
is for the jury whenever the evidence is such that
jurors, acting fairly and reasonably, may say that
they are not convinced by a preponderance of the
evidence that the plaintiff was guilty of negligence
which proximately contributed to cause his own
.InJury.
.
"It should be kept in mind that so far as the
quantum of proof necessary to take the question
of contributory negligence from the jury is concerned, the tests are the same as with respect to
21
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primary negligence. For instance, in a given case,
there may be some evidence upon which a finding
of negligence by the defendant could be based, yet
the jury may remain in such a state of mind that
they may fairly say that they are not convinced
by preponderance of the evidence that the defendant was negligent, and based upon such failure of proof may refuse to find a verdict against
him. It would only be when the defendant's negligence had been established with such certainty
that all reasonable care, that the court would rule
as a matter of law that he was negligent and
direct the jury to find a verdict against him; conversely, if evidence were such that reasonable
men may fairly say that they are not convinced
from a preponderance of the evidence, that he was
guilty of negligence, the court could not rule that
he was negligent as a matter of law and take the
case from the jury.
"These principles apply in identical fashion
to the question of plaintiff's contributory negligence except that the defendant has the burden of
proof. That the evidence is such that the jury
may find from a preponderance of the evidence
that the plaintiff failed to use due care for his o"\\rn
safety is not sufficient. The proof must establish
his failure to do so with such certainty that all
reasonable minds must so conclude before the
court may rule as a matter of law that he is precluded from recovery on that ground. The court
should exercise caution and forebearance in considering taking questions of fact from the jury.''
In Morby v. Rogers, (Utah) 252 Pac. (2d)

~31.

Justice l\IcDonough at page 232-3 said :
''Reasonable minds, however, "\\ronld be justified in inferring nt•gligencP on thP part of de22
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fendant from circumstantial physical facts also
brought out in the record. For example the lack
of skid or brake marks would justify an inference
against defendant's purported ''quick action'' to
avoid the accident. The final position of the automobile in the canal would justify a finding that
defendant 'vas traveling faster than his testimony
indicated and that such speed indicated his lack
of control over the automobile at the time of the
accident. Furthermore, the testimony in regard
to the boy's injuries would justify a finding that
the deceased was struck with great force and was
not ''just tipped over'' as defendant and his wife
testified. The fact that extent of injury to the
bicycle consisted of a damaged rear mud guard
and that there was no injury to the front of the
bicycle would justify a finding that the boy did
not turn into defendant as was contended, but
rather was struck from behind. In addition to
this reasonable minds could find from the point of
impact and the position of deceased's body that
the boy had not made any sudden turn but had
gradually veered over onto the west portion of
the highway before he was struck.
"It is not a new or novel principle that acts of
negligence may be proved by circumstances. Certainly, in many cases, particularly where the only
eye witnesses are parties having an interest in
the action, such circumstances are the only means
by which certain facts may be valuated by the
jury in whose province lies the power to believe
or disbelieve the testimony of the witnesses, and
to draw such reasonable conclusions from the
whole record as may be warranted.
''We are of the opinion that reasonable minds
could find negligence on the part, of the defendant
from the evidence in the record. The trial court
therefore did not err in letting the question of
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defendant's negligence go to the jury under the
evidence. ' '
ARGUMENT
It is respectfully contended that it is a jury question
as to whether or not the plaintiff exercised due care in
keeping a lookout while she was crossing the street and
whether she gave sufficient reappraisals of the traffic
approaching from the west as she was proceeding across
the street.
The Judge, even in his statement in which he.directed
the verdict, admitted that there was some conflicting evidence of the speed of the vehicle which of necessity '\\!ould
make this a jury question. Further, the circumstantial
evidence is conflicting as to whether or not the plaintiff
was merely bumped and tipped over or whether she wa.s
thrown through the air, a further conflict of warning by
horn and a conflict of brake marks, all of which were to
be determined by the triers of the fact and therefore was
a jury question.
CONCLUSION
It is respectfully submitted that the Court erred in
this matter in directing a verdict against the plaintiff
and invaded the province of the jury in so ruling.
Respectfully submitted,
W. D. BEATIE
Attorney for Plaintiff
and Appellant.
24

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

